Decommissioning the Nimitz is a Huge Mistake..

[royamcr]

Originally Posted by Precious_b

I wanted you to be clear since they are both different class carriers. But you neglected to say if the Enterprise was able to bear all reactors power output to the shafts.

And I was not comparing them. I was using them as an example of fluid dynamics and the drag efficiencies. Or loss of trying to push things faster. There definitely is a point of diminishing returns with a given hull design.

Amazes me these big aircraft carriers can shit-n-get that fast.

The reactors don't put power directly to the shafts. The reactors boil water creating steam for turbines that turn the propellers. You could have all the reactors full bore but it's limited by the power of the steam engines.

[pxmcc]

^^and what's harder, building a new ship or replacing spent nuclear fuel..


why the Nimitz should not be decommissioned:

1. Strategic Deterrence and Presence Still Matter More Than Marginal Savings
Aircraft carriers are not just weapons platforms; they are mobile sovereign territory. The Nimitz provides persistent, visible deterrence that cannot be replicated by submarines, long-range bombers, or missiles alone.

A carrier strike group signals commitment, not just capability.

Forward-deployed carriers reduce escalation risk by providing flexible response options short of war.

Decommissioning reduces the U.S. Navy’s ability to maintain continuous presence in multiple theaters (Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Europe).

At a time of increased great-power competition—especially with China—shrinking visible force posture invites testing and miscalculation.

2. Fleet Size Is Already at the Lower Bound of Credible Global Coverage
The U.S. Navy is already struggling to meet Combatant Commander demand with its current carrier inventory.

The statutory goal is 11 operational aircraft carriers.

Maintenance delays and extended overhauls routinely reduce the number actually available.

Removing Nimitz without a fully operational replacement creates a real capability gap, not a theoretical one.

This is not a one-for-one swap problem; carriers take years to build, certify, and integrate into fleet operations. Early decommissioning creates irreversible near-term risk.

3. The Nimitz Remains Militarily Relevant with Modern Air Wings
While the hull is old, the combat power of a carrier resides primarily in its air wing and networks, not the ship’s age.

Modern aircraft (F/A-18E/F, EA-18G, E-2D, and potentially F-35C integration) dramatically extend lethality.

Upgraded command, control, and ISR systems allow legacy carriers to operate effectively in networked warfare.

The ship remains nuclear-powered, giving it endurance advantages over conventionally powered alternatives.

The argument that Nimitz is “obsolete” conflates platform age with combat irrelevance, which is not supported by operational reality.

4. Decommissioning Sends the Wrong Signal to Allies and Adversaries
Naval force structure decisions are strategic communications, whether intended or not.

Allies interpret early decommissioning as declining U.S. commitment.

Adversaries interpret it as waning political will to sustain global presence.

The timing—amid heightened Indo-Pacific tensions—magnifies that signal.

Deterrence depends not just on weapons, but on credibility and consistency.

5. Cost Arguments Are Often Overstated and Poorly Contextualized
While operating a nuclear carrier is expensive, the marginal savings from early decommissioning are frequently exaggerated.

Decommissioning itself is costly, particularly for nuclear vessels.

Savings are modest compared to the overall defense budget.

The cost of losing deterrence or failing to respond to a crisis dwarfs annual operating costs.

Strategic assets should not be evaluated using narrow peacetime accounting logic.

6. Risk of Over-Correction Based on Unproven Future Concepts
Much of the push to retire legacy carriers rests on assumptions about future warfare:

That long-range missiles will make carriers unusable

That unmanned systems will soon replace carrier aviation

That distributed lethality can fully substitute for concentrated power

These concepts are not yet mature. Retiring proven capability before replacements are fully operational is a classic case of strategic over-correction.

7. Institutional Knowledge, Training, and Surge Capacity
The Nimitz is not just a ship; it is a training platform and surge asset.

Maintains carrier pilot proficiency and deck crew experience.

Provides operational depth in case of unforeseen conflict.

Reduces stress on newer carriers and maintenance cycles.

Once decommissioned, this capacity cannot be rapidly regenerated.

Bottom Line
Decommissioning the USS Nimitz prematurely would:

Reduce U.S. global deterrence

Create real, near-term capability gaps

Save relatively little money

Signal declining resolve to allies and adversaries

Bet national security on unproven future systems

The prudent course is to retain Nimitz until replacement capacity is fully operational, not merely planned.

does new steel beat old steel, actually..

[The_Waco_Kid]

Originally Posted by royamcr

The reactors don't put power directly to the shafts. The reactors boil water creating steam for turbines that turn the propellers. You could have all the reactors full bore but it's limited by the power of the steam engines.

don't forget bearing shaft temps. as i stated the reactors can overpower all of the physical machinery.



while we are speaking of nuclear powered watercraft's let's start at the beginning


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Nautilus_(SSN-571)


the one that started it all .. proved the nuke power concept






the origin of the nuke sub service and the nuclear powered aircraft carrier


while this was poc nuke concept it was a 6 tube navy combat vessel also by design



the Navy wanted an all nuke Navy. they built 4 cruiser/frigate nuke ships along with the Enterprise. and a Nimitz class the four prototype nuclear Navy







Task Force One, the first nuclear-powered task force. Enterprise, Long Beach and Bainbridge are in formation in the Mediterranean, 18 June 1964. Enterprise has Einstein's mass–energy equivalence formula E=mc² spelled out on her flight deck. Note the distinctive phased-array radars in the superstructures of Enterprise and Long Beach.


and this










Nimitz on her first deployment in 1976 alongside nuclear-powered cruisers California and South Carolina



the Navy had to settle for nuke carriers and subs and conventional warships.


but this is what it could have been.

[ICU 812]

Originally Posted by Precious_b

Could the Enterprise put all that extra power to the prop shaft? If so, do you know what the unofficial speed of it was since I don't think they would offer a rated speed.

I was reading about the problems with the power output of engines on the New York class battleships and the studies the engineers did with the Iowa class. It essentially boiled down to diminishing returns. I can't remember the numbers but it sorta mimicked that at a point you had to add 25% more power to just get a couple knots more speed. Crazy.

For a non-plaining hull, top speed is limited by the waterline length among other things. There is a formula involving square roots and so on, but overall length is the major controlling factor. Our nuclear carriers are the longest ship in the US Navy and have as much power as cn be delivered as thrust through propellers.

Years ago I worked in a VA hospital. I had the opportunity to talk with Vets all dya long. The top speed of a carrier was a topic I explored. Anecdotally, it seems that a nuclear carrier can out run any other ship in its task force. I am under the impression that at full throttle, 60 MPH is possible.

I would welcome anyone with a solid number to comment.

[royamcr]

Originally Posted by pxmcc

^^and how much does a new carrier cost, and how long to build..

About 4 times the refuel/refit. But a twice refueled carrier would be 50 years old with old problems. Salt water is very corrosive so I bet there is plenty of rust and worn out parts under all that paint.

[ICU 812]

With the Navy's current emphasis on the concept of "Distributed Lethality", IMHO, they would do better to build a number of smaller carriers as we did in WW-II. I would like to see additional amphibious ships with enhanced capabilities for air assets.

While this might actually cost more in construction, staffing, operations and maintenance, the probability on one catastrophic sinking would be spread out with more targets.

In the 1980s Falklands War, the UK used a container ship to launch Harrier fighter jets. Something like that could be another option.

The Air Force has expanded their strike capability and spread out their vulnerability by weaponizing most of their cargo transports (C-130, C-17 and C-5B). Any platform that can air-drop a pallet of supplies can now deploy a swarm of cruse missiles.